Cover-up of Russia’s 2002 offer to store Japan’s spent nuclear fuel a wasted opportunity

Government officials’ cover-up of a diplomatic document, in which Russia once offered to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel generated at nuclear power stations in Japan, has deprived the public of opportunities to have discussions on Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy.It was revealed that Russia sent a diplomatic document to Japan in 2002 to propose storing radioactive waste from Japanese nuclear plants and to reprocess it.

The document was handed to some top officials of the Cabinet Office’s Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE). However they concealed it even from a government advisory panel that was deliberating on the pros and cons of the nuclear fuel cycle policy for fear that the proposal could adversely affect the prospects of activating a radioactive waste reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture.

Approximately 900 to 1,000 tons of radioactive waste is generated at nuclear power stations across Japan each year.

The government had planned to reprocess the full amount domestically, but was struggling to secure storage space because it was unable to start operations at the Rokkasho plant.

“The cover-up of the document has eliminated the possibility of storing spent nuclear fuel overseas. It was a huge mistake,” says a mid-ranking official with the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry, the parent body of the ANRE.

An insider of JAEC recalled that the timing of the cover-up was “extremely delicate.” In December 2001, it came to light that water was leaking from the fuel storage pool of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. Various problems, such as a piping blunder and the recurrence of water leakages, subsequently surfaced.

The Advisory Committee on Energy and Natural Resources estimated in January 2004 that spent nuclear waste reprocessing will cost taxpayers approximately 19 trillion yen, prompting the JAEC subcommittee to begin considering in June that year whether Japan should maintain its nuclear fuel reprocessing policy.

Russia’s offer came amid these moves. “We were afraid that revelations of the diplomatic document could spur calls to abandon reprocessing radioactive waste in Japan and to seriously consider Russia’s proposal,” recalls an ANRE source.

Russia was aiming to obtain foreign currency by processing radioactive waste from overseas. In 2001, then President Vladimir Putin signed bills aimed at permitting imports of nuclear fuel and was aggressively offering to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

The offer could have drawn opposition in Japan, such as “It’d be a problem to commission Russia to reprocess radioactive waste from the viewpoint of security,” and “It’d be inappropriate to bring waste generated in Japan to other countries.”

However, it is also unreasonable for government regulators of nuclear power and nuclear power industry insiders to decide on Japan’s diplomatic policy solely at their own discretion. As France was commissioning Russia to reprocess its nuclear waste at the time, Japan should have seriously considered Moscow’s offer.

The Atomic Energy Basic Law calls for democracy, autonomy and disclosure as the three basic principles of the government’s nuclear power policy. However, they are far from realistic. The culture of secrecy in the nuclear power industry and government regulators was highlighted by the Mainichi Shimbun’s report in May that Japan and the United States had been considering a top-secret plan to build a spent nuclear fuel storage and reprocessing facility in Mongolia.

A former ANRE official said he had been told by his boss to “carry your knowledge of Japan’s nuclear power policy to the grave.”

A system needs to be established to prevent the nuclear power industry and government regulators from concealing information on nuclear power. (By Tadashi Kobayashi, Kenji Shimizu and Seiichi Ota, Mainichi Shimbun)

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